Reading the ICS-CERT security alerts on a daily basis can make you despair, even though most of the vulnerabilities and attacks in and on industrial systems aren't actually world-shattering. However, a few of them do stand out - for example when the target is in use extremely often or the vulnerability is fairly easy to exploit.
A week ago, security researcher Rubén Santamarta publicly announced details of multiple vulnerabilities affecting the Schneider Electric Quantum PLC Ethernet Module, and coordinated his findings with ICS-CERT. The Quantum Ethernet Module is prone to an authentication-bypass vulnerability.
Remember Stuxnet, anyone? It never became totally clear who was behind – speculations range from the CIA to Mossad to the flying spaghetti monster; at least two of these might be interested in Stuxnet's main target, Iranian nuclear facilities with neglected Windows installations. Now, parts of Stuxnet's code seem to have been recycled in a different type of malware, a trojan horse.
Strangely enough, many serious studies indicate that industrial networks seem to be easier to penetrate than »consumer« networks. Just try scanning the Wifi networks in or around the factory of your choice with your iPhone and log in with »1234« »autumn« or »password«. It works frighteningly often.
»Why don’t you write about Stuxnet?« – »Stuxnet is a must in an automation blog!« Well… sometimes even I should take advice from readers. In this case, however, I’m not sure if I really should, at least not at the moment. Why?
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